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REACHING THE UNREACHED: CHALLENGES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
DURING THE WATER and Sanitation Decade (1980 - 1990),
many lessons were learnt about the benefits of user in-
volvement in sustainable projects, and the importance of
correct incentives in positive behavioural change. Two
key principles emerged at the end of the decade, and were
endorsed at international fora, such as Dublin and
Nordwijk. The principles are firstly, that water, and its
corollary sanitation, are an economic, as well as a social
good and should be managed as such; secondly, that
water and sanitation should be managed at the lowest
appropriate level, with users involved in the planning
and implementation of projects.
In response to this many donors, NGOs and to some
extent governments are currently reviewing the experi-
ences of community involvement. They are attempting to
design programmes that build on the strengths of the
community and focus on recovering at least part of the
costs of production of infrastructure from the community
who benefits from it.
The purpose of this paper is to briefly review some
experiences of the process of joint government and com-
munity finance and operation of urban sanitation in low
income urban communities; to consider what potential it
has for reducing the costs of sanitation provision (thus
increasing the chances of sustainable outcomes); and
discuss the potential constraints to the establishment of a
new institutional framework, integrating the community
further into the process of sanitation administration and
production.
For the purposes of this paper urban sanitation, and
specifically piped sewerage has been considered. While
much of the conceptual framework is independent of
technology choice, a consideration of a piped sewerage
network, is useful because it is, by implication, a consid-
eration of a situation where an Executive Agency of
Government— for example as a municipal corporation or
water board, has a clear role to play in external (or
primary) investments, such as main sewers and sewage
treatment plants.
The paper builds on the concept of Internal (household
and lane) and External (trunk and treatment) develop-
ment first established by the Orangi Pilot Project in Paki-
stan, where the community takes responsibility for the
Internal development— including planning, design, con-
struction, operation and maintenance— and arrange for
the financing themselves. External development remains
the responsibility of the Executive Agency of Govern-
ment (Akhter Hameed Khan: 1994: 12).
Community participation, collective action
First, let us assume that Internal development can take
place independent of External development. If the com-
munity can significantly lower the costs of administration
and production of sanitation internally then the chances
of achieving a net flow of benefits must rise.  This depends
on the potential for collective action within the commu-
nity.
Robert Wade, among others, has done valuable work
identifying the conditions under which joint manage-
ment of resources can be successful (Wade: 1987).  Wade
convincingly argues that the success of rural common
property regimes depends on five factors associated with
the resource and the user group: a small and clearly
defined resource; a close physical proximity between the
resource and users and a high level of dependence on the
resource; a small and defined group of users, having
established “arrangements for discussing common prob-
lems” and with the relative balance of power in the hands
of sub-groups favouring  communal action; high
“noticeability” of cheating on arrangements; and high
costs of “exclusion technology” (Wade: 1987: 231-2).   What
relevance do these factors have to urban sanitation and on
balance do they mitigate in favour of successful collective
action?
The “resource” which we are considering is the stream
of benefits which arise from the capital stock of infrastruc-
ture (Ostrom et al.: 1993: 85). The stream of benefits from
sanitation may not be well defined and externalities may
blur the boundary of benefits. Concerns surrounding
employment, housing and debt may far outweigh per-
ceptions about the need for sanitation.
The group of users will be geographically well defined,
but the existence of power structures and mechanisms for
consultation cannot be guaranteed.  In the general case
the most useful conclusion to be drawn is that the more
homogeneous the community, the greater are the chances
of a successful common property regime developing.
“Noticeability” is related to the characteristics of both
the resource and the user group. It will vary at different
stages of production. It may, for example, be easier to
shirk on a monthly cleaning rota than it would be to avoid
contributing prearranged labour or time to initial con-
struction when the whole group may be more aware of
the actions of each individual.
“Exclusion technology” in Wade’s analysis, is impor-
tant where individuals can gain control over a “priva-
tised” stream of benefits by excluding other users. In
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exceptional cases, where power is highly concentrated,
the issue of exploitative privatisation within the commu-
nity may become important but generally, in view of the
poorly defined public benefits of sanitation and the need
for all users to be involved in order to realise the full
benefit stream, individuals would have few incentives to
gain control of a scheme.
In summary then, the nature of the resource and prob-
lems of low noticeability in operation and maintenance
will generally mitigate against successful collective ac-
tion in the community. The potential for successful collec-
tive action will then rest on the extent to which existing
and potential structures within the community can over-
ride these factors.
Administration and production
Lowering the costs
Let us assume, for the moment, that conditions for collec-
tive action do exist, and that a group of householders
formed a user group to provide a sanitation service for
themselves. What advantages would such a group have?
On the administration side both transformation and
transaction costs should fall. The key features of such a
user group should be accountability and adaptability.
The group must be small enough to ensure good commu-
nication and low cost monitoring, bringing down coordi-
nation costs.
One of the strengths of the Orangi Pilot Project is its use
of the “lane” as the organisational unit in the community,
thus guaranteeing a geographically defined group, and
increasing the potential for self monitoring. Good time
and place information will be more readily available to
the group than it would be, for example, to officials from
the Executive Agency of the Government.
The group may be prepared to experiment with low
cost solutions because they are not limited by technical
preconceptions. However, there will almost certainly be
a shortfall of scientific knowledge. It is important not to
underestimate the costs of providing necessary technical
assistance. OPP, for example, invested twelve months in
Research and Extension work in Orangi prior to the
implementation of any community sanitation. The cost of
this was carried not by the community but by external
commercial institutions (Akhter Hameed Khan: 1995:
1,7). Even then maintenance and supervision problems
persisted (Abbott: 1985: 84).
The extent to which community financing is an ad-
equate mechanism for establishing citizen preferences and
willingness to pay is disputable and requires a great deal of
further study. In particular, post project reviews are needed,
to establish to what extent pre-project willingness to pay,
established through whatever mechanism, is reflected in
post-project payment for services. Intuitively, it seems
that the community itself would be the most effective
agent for establishing demand, but effective mechanisms
for achieving this are yet to be rigorously proved.
Finally, we turn to production. In Orangi, innovative
designs and the elimination of contractors is estimated to
have brought down the transformation costs of produc-
tion to around one third of the cost of a conventional
system (ibid: 69) excluding External development. Sav-
ings of around Rs 100 per metre of sewerage have been
achieved (Rs 100 = £2 (1995 prices)) . However, both
transformation and transaction costs will be much higher
to the community than under the centralised system. The
impact of cash payments on the community is hard to
establish.
Under the OPP programme in Orangi it was estimated
that the average investment of each household in the
sanitation system was Rs 1,000 compared with an average
investment of Rs 20 -25,000 in the house itself (i.e. invest-
ment in sanitation is worth between 4 and 5 percent of the
value of the house). OPP estimate this to be equal to the
average monthly income per household (Akhter Hameed
Khan: 1995: 7-8). While these figures suggest that the
investment in sanitation is manageable, they fail to cap-
ture the costs of contributions in kind and the opportunity
costs of time devoted to the programme. When these are
included the real costs of community provision are likely
to be significantly higher.
The use of community members in operation and main-
tenance may also be expected to bring down costs and
increase effectiveness. However, community involvement
in operation and maintenance may be harder to mobilise,
principally because the benefits of good maintenance are
even less tangible to the community than the benefits of
the original installation. Regular maintenance, carried
out periodically by selected group members, is harder to
monitor than contributions to construction— less visible
and harder to physically check.
Evidence from Orangi during the early years of the
programme suggests that maintenance was often “crisis
management” rather than good routine preventative
maintenance. The fact that a minority of groups manage
effective organisation of maintenance only serves to high-
light that in many other cases the institutional founda-
tions for a sustainable system have not been adequately
laid (Abbott: 1985: 99).
Internal and external development
So far we have been looking at the potential for Internal
development which is independent of External develop-
ment. However, in many urban situations one is depend-
ant upon the other to function satisfactorily. What are the
incentives for the actors currently involved in sanitation
provision to coordinate with the community, and what
would the cost be?
The use of community financing will bring down the
transformation costs of production for the Government.
This is one of the principal theoretical underpinnings of
such policy. However, it is important to recognise that a
corresponding rise in transaction costs is likely to occur,
both on the administration and production sides.
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There are few examples of successful attempts to coor-
dinate Internal community financed development with
publicly financed External development. Nonetheless
some lessons can be drawn from the available evidence.
In the Urban Basic Services Project in Sukkur, Pakistan,
the OPP model has been adopted under a programme
funded by UNICEF. This programme commenced in 1988
and involves three Executive Agencies of the govern-
ment, one international donor organisation, one consult-
ant, the community and two new organisational entities,
a site office and a steering committee, which were set up
as part of the coordination effort (Arif Hasan: 1994: 16).
UNICEF provided the majority of the funds for Exter-
nal development and funded training for government
staff, both for existing postholders and for new posts that
were created as part of the project.
Reports from the UBS project highlight the lengthy
procedures required to establish working relationships
between the various actors. It was two years before an
agreement was signed on the methods to be adopted in
the project. Poor coordination between Executive Agen-
cies proved a major stumbling block even before the
project commenced.
OPP, who acted as consultant to the project through the
OPP Research and Training Institution, note that “vari-
ous government organisations are not aware of each
others plans and responsibilities [nor] of the funds that
are available to their sister organisations “ (ibid.: 33).
Lengthy negotiations between Executive Agencies have
delayed External development after commencement of
the project, jeopardising the development of community
groups for Internal development. In some cases money
collected for Internal works was returned to residents
because of delays on the Government side (ibid.: 26-9).
Conclusion
In the short term we have seen that the transaction costs,
and therefore the total costs, of sanitation provision jointly
with the community may be high. Nonetheless the pres-
ence of external funding may be catalytic in overcoming
this. In the longer term these transaction costs could be
brought down if the concept of coordinated development
became part of mainstream government policy. Institu-
tional arrangements could then be established, staff trained
and many of the one-off costs of a project such as the
Sukkur UBS would disappear.
The coordination of investments from the community
and the government is often proposed, with the twin
objectives of increasing the resources available for sanita-
tion provision and increasing the chances of achieving
sustainable infrastructure. The success of such an ap-
proach is predicated on the assumption that the commu-
nity contains the potential for collective action.
Proponents of these policies often fail to analyse the
high costs of coordinating such investments. Most impor-
tantly of all they may underestimate the structures that
exist in society, in Executive Agencies and within the
Community, which will resist institutional changes based
on the coordinated provision of services.
Critically, what is required is that programmes de-
signed within the concept of partnership between com-
munity and government should be carefully monitored—
to allow for a clear evaluation when things appear to go
wrong. The concepts behind the approach are sound;
what is needed now is to develop a clear understanding
of the constraints to successful implementation— so that
programme design can be steadily improved based on
growing experience in real project situations.
Based on the above analysis it will be important in
future programmes to develop systems to monitor total
costs to all stakeholders and to acknowledge constraints.
Indicators to be monitored might include: the nature of
the community (degree of homogeneity, power struc-
tures) and its relationship to the Executive Agency of
Government; administration (transactions and coordina-
tion) costs of intra community negotiations; administra-
tion costs of negotiations between community and the
External Agency of Government; manner in which will-
ingness to pay for services (demand) is established, and
how this relates to post programme performance; costs of
production of services both to the community and to the
government; and evidence of systemic resistance to the
partnership arrangement.
Notes
Here Administration refers to “decisions made through
public choice mechanisms” about: the levels, quantity
and quality of services; the degree of regulation; the
production and financing arrangements; and monitoring
performance. Administration cost includes both Transac-
tions and Coordination costs. Production refers to “ the
more technical process of transforming inputs into out-
puts— making a product or in many cases rendering a
service.” (Ostrom et al.: 1993: 74).
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